

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7040
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 03774

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PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET VIEWS ON KEY ISSUES

CTB MESSAGE NO. 168

1. SUMMARY. DURING BILATERAL LUNCH ATTENDED BY MOROKHOV AND TIMERBAEV (USSR) AND WARNKE, JOHNSON AND NEIDLE (US), SOVIET AND US REPS EXPLORED PRESENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON VERIFICATION AND ON ISSUES OF DURATION AND LINKAGE OF THE PNE MORATORIUM WITH THE WEAPONS TEST BAN. THEY ALSO DISCUSSED WORK SCHEDULE UNTIL EASTER BREAK. FOLLOWING PARAS SUMMARIZE MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST THAT EMERGED.
END SUMMARY.

2. ON DURATION AND PNE LINKAGE, MOROKHOV SAID THAT SOVIETS "WERE PREPARED TO HAVE THE PNE MORATORIUM CONTINUE AS LONG AS THE WEAPONS BAN CONTINUES". HE EXPLAINED THAT SOVIETS REALIZED THEIR EXISTING POSITION HAD DEFECTS. THEY AGREED WITH US; THEY DID NOT WANT TO SEE PNES RESUME
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WITHOUT MUTUAL AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING THEM. WHEN PRESSED, MOROKHOV SAID HIS DEL WAS PLANNING TO RECOMMEND TO MOSCOW THAT TREATY HAVE THREE-YEAR INITIAL DURATION, THAT THERE COULD BE A REVIEW CONFERENCE, THAT THE WEAPONS BAN COULD BE CONTINUED AND ALSO THE PNE MORATORIUM (ASSUMING NO AGREEMENT ON PROCEDURES FOR CONDUCTING PNES), THAT THE ARRANGEMENT WOULD INCLUDE SOME PROCEDURE

FOR "UNITY OF ACTION" BY THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS, AND THAT THERE WOULD BE ONE WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE (THE SUPREME INTERESTS CLAUSE) IN THE TREATY. MOROKHOV INSISTED SEVERAL TIMES THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON DURATION AND PNE ISSUES WOULD BE EASY AND POLITICAL FORMULAS COULD BE WORKED OUT QUICKLY--BUT ONLY AFTER THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT ON HOW TO HANDLE VERIFICATION. (NOTE: IN CONVERSATION LATER IN THE DAY WITH UK AMB. CRADOCK, MOROKHOV APPARENTLY WENT OVER SAME GROUND; BUT, ACCORDING TO CRADOCK, MOROKHOV DESCRIBED AN INITIAL DURATION OF FOUR YEARS. HE REPORTEDLY SAID IT WOULD BE "LIKE IN THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL--THREE YEARS PLUS ONE", AND HE HAD IN MIND THAT THE LAST OR FOURTH YEAR OF THE INITIAL PERIOD WOULD BE WHEN THE THREE NUCLEAR PARTIES WOULD CONSULT ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE TREATY AND DECIDE "PERHAPS BY CONSENSUS".)

3. ON VERIFICATION, MOROKHOV STRESSED THAT THIS WAS THE CRITICAL ISSUE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SOVIETS. THE QUESTION OF INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS SEEMED THE MOST DIFFICULT ASPECT, FOLLOWED BY ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. GIVEN THE GENERAL HISTORY OF THE VERIFICATION ISSUE, SOVIET OFFICIALS WOULD VIEW THE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AS THE SINGLE OVERALL TEST OF WHETHER A TREATY WAS POSSIBLE. AGREEING ON ACCEPTABLE FORMULAS FOR DURATION AND PNEs WOULD BE EASY BY COMPARISON. HE EXPLAINED THAT
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MANY SOVIET OFFICIALS IN MOSCOW, MANY OF WHOM HE KNEW WELL, WOULD BE QUITE HAPPY IF THE U.S. INSISTED ON OVERLY DETAILED AND NON-NEGOTIABLE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS BECAUSE THEN THERE WOULD BE NO TREATY. THE SOVIET DELEGATION WAS TRYING TO PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING BY PROPOSING PRACTICAL APPROACHES THAT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE. MOROKHOV COMMENTED, IN PASSING, THAT, FOR THE SOVIET UNION, VERIFICATION UNDER THE CTB WAS POLITICALLY MUCH MORE DIFFICULT THAN IN SALT BECAUSE IN THE LATTER THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT FOR EMPLACING VERIFICATION EQUIPMENT IN THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION, NOR WAS THERE ANY PROCEDURE FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION.

4. ON INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS (ISIS), MOROKHOV REPEATED AT LENGTH HIS VIEW THAT US PROPOSALS WERE FAR TOO DETAILED AND THAT WORKING OUT OF TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE A JOB BETTER SUITED FOR THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WHERE THERE WOULD BE A LESS POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE AND WHERE TECHNICAL OFFICIALS CONSEQUENTLY WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO WORK THINGS OUT SATISFACTORILY. REGARDING SOVIET DEL'S ARGUMENT THAT

EQUIPMENT PROPOSED BY US WOULDN'T BE READY WHEN THE TREATY ENTERED INTO FORCE AND THAT VERIFICATION SHOULD BEGIN PROMPTLY, WARNKE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONSIDER IF THERE WAS GOOD SEISMIC EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE FOR IMMEDIATE EMPLACEMENT AND USE WHEN THE TREATY BEGAN. BUT WARNKE TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE IDEA THAT ALL TECHNICAL DETAILS COULD BE LEFT TO A JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION. HE REFERRED TO MOROKHOV'S EMPHASIS ON THE NEED FOR CLARITY WITH RESPECT TO VERIFICATION AND SAID

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WE ALSO NEEDED CLARITY ON THE FUNCTION AND CAPABILITY OF ISIS. HE ALSO ARGUED AGAINST THE SOVIET DEL'S IDEA THAT ISIS WERE LITERALLY ONLY A SUPPLEMENT TO BE USED WHEN NEEDED TO ASSIST NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, EXPLAINING IN GENERAL TERMS THAT NATIONAL SEISMIC CAPABILITIES HAD INHERENT LIMITATIONS AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO IMPROVE CAPABILITIES THROUGH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ISIS. MOROKHOV EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT PRESENT DETECTION THRESHOLD WAS ABOUT ONE-HALF A KILOTON. HE THEN REMARKED THAT "WE WOULD NOT DO NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS UNDER THIS LEVEL". WARNKE DID NOT COMMENT.

5. ON SCHEDULE OF WORK AND EASTER BREAK, MOROKHOV AND WARNKE AGREED TO USE NEXT TEN DAYS ESPECIALLY TO TRY TO GAIN MAXIMUM ADDITIONAL CLARITY REGARDING VERIFICATION ISSUES. WARNKE SAID THAT HE WOULD TRY TO PROVIDE COMMENTS IN A PLENARY ON MARCH 17 ON SOVIET DEL'S IDEAS

ON INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS. MOROKHOV BELIEVED IT
WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HOLD LAST PLENARY OF CURRENT ROUND
ON MARCH 21. ON DURATION OF EASTER BREAK, WARNKE AND
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MOROKHOV BOTH THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL TO THE
NEGOTIATIONS TO HAVE REASONABLE PERIOD AFTER EASTER
FOR REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES IN CAPITALS. MOROKHOV AGREED
THAT HE WOULD REPORT APRIL 19 TO MOSCOW AS DATE WHEN NEXT
PLENARY MEETING SHOULD BE SCHEDULED FOLLOWING EASTER.
WARNKE

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